Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
when confidence in air-to-air missiles resulted in a lack of pilot air-to-air training and omission of a gun on the original F-4 Phantom. When losses mounted, the United States went "back to the basics" and integrated training programs and proven methods to regain desired kill ratios. 3 UAV technology has tempted commanders to integrate unproven platforms into the operational environment. Following the September 11 th attacks and ensuing Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations, the Predator and Global Hawk UAVs were placed into service prior to completion of required operational milestones. 4 Fortunately, the action resulted in largely successful results. Elward, Brad. U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965 -1970 .(Osprey Publishing, 2001 and manned fixed-wing vehicles will be included in the following analysis, and will focus on missions of fixed-wing platforms at the operational level of war.
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One of the most important subjects of debate is survivability of platforms in adverse environments. In recent history, mishap rates of UAVs soared as high as one hundred times that of manned vehicles. 27 These numbers, in an era of decreasing budgets, scaled-down procurement and comparable price tags, are unacceptable by any standard. In the ten-year period from 1994 to 2003, more than one-third of the Predator operating fleet was lost in various mishaps. 28 In the early days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, one of only two Global Hawk UAVs was lost to a mishap, costing the operational commander one-half of his current theater assets. 29 Although the original RQ-1 Predator"s cost was only one-fifth that of an Air Force F-16C, the commander now must view today"s advanced UAV platforms as ""aircraft" versus airframes that may be treated as expendable or attritable equipment," and historically high mishap rates that impact numbers of platforms available for operational functions cannot be tolerated. 30 Previously considered expendable, UAVs are now equipped with sensors, weapons suites and equipment that force attrition and compromise to become factors when comparing unmanned and manned technology. 31 With mission "creep" and increasing acquisition costs prevalent between both types of platforms, high-tech UAVs such as the Global Hawk became as expensive as its comparable manned platform, the U-2.
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Even today, "the per-unit and per-pound development and procurement costs of medium and large unmanned vehicles are similar to the costs associated with manned vehicles."
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Combined with costs of ground stations and communications relays, one must question whether UAVs will actually be more cost-effective over time than their manned counterparts.
UAVs must also overcome significant hurdles regarding all-weather capability.
Runway takeoffs and landings, routine events for manned platforms, remain one of the most dangerous times for unmanned fixed-wing platforms, and designers hope to reduce mishaps caused in this flight regime by automating these evolutions and removing ground personnel costlier designs that will satisfy operational requirements.
As next-generation UAVs are designed for expanding roles and responsibilities, they must carry larger weapons suites and more sensors. This will contribute to the requirement for a larger powerplant, as mentioned above. Attempts to maintain a smaller airframe and lower radar cross-section, without compromising loiter time, will necessitate in-flight refueling capabilities. 46 Vast research continues for the advancement of UAV technology, and one of the most difficult tasks encountered by design teams involves in-flight refueling.
Thus far, these teams have been unable to successfully design, test and implement control mechanisms that reliably complete coordinated tasks of the in-flight refueling evolution.
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Several factors must be considered. Multiple platforms must be capable of simultaneously executing rendezvous on tanking platforms at a specified time, with minimal delay.
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Additionally, unmanned platforms must exercise deconfliction from one another and manned aircraft, a task that has proven difficult to meet. 49 Once joined, the UAV must also be able to routinely make and maintain contact in a safe and successful manner with the refueling platform. 50 In an era of rising costs and more complex platforms, the margin for error will be 45 --. Airborne platforms must counter enemy denial of datalink connectivity via EW, fighting through the environment to find, target and destroy airborne targets in the Within Visual Range (WVR) air-to-air arena. 57 Some limitations already present in the air-toground environment, such as two-dimensional displays and the "soda straw effect" of sensors, could severely limit the commander"s ability to employ UCAVs in air-to-air roles.
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While designs of future UCAVs will likely physically outperform manned vehicles, sustaining high "G" forces and demonstrating tighter turn capability than their counterpart, the crux of a successful dogfight is the ability to quickly find an adversary in a threedimensional, panoramic field, then effectively maneuver to a position from which one can employ weapons. Even if technology existed that could process and display this enormous amount of data for a ground controller, the question persists: Could a single controller, or possibly a larger team of required controllers utilizing flawless crew coordination, process the data and effectively maneuver the platform? "Aerial combat is often described as the most challenging mission for manned aircraft to perform," and operational commanders must proceed with caution when considering employment of UAV teams as the sole providers of air superiority or supremacy. Commanders must also consider levels of training and readiness required for employment of UAVs in combat operations. Many analysts assert that replacement of pilots will result in significant cost reductions, yet research demonstrates that "money saved by not having a pilot must be applied to the "ground cockpit" of the UAV aircrew" at the ground station. 60 Mishaps rates for "pilot-required" UAVs such as the Predator are also markedly lower than those of other UAVs such as the Hunter, Global Hawk or Shadow, which are either autonomously flown or operated by personnel with no aviation background.
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Although operators do not fly from within the airframe, the layout of the ground console often resembles the cockpit layout seen by airborne pilots. 62 Expanded roles and missions will necessitate more and better-trained personnel, and a team of several personnel may be required for a single UCAV. 63 While advocates of unmanned technology assert that a single controller will successfully "pilot" multiple platforms, studies show that tasks as simple as remote taxiing of a single unmanned platform can challenge experienced operators. 64 Longer missions and extended loiter times will also fatigue ground-based controllers or teams similar to airborne personnel, and the margin for error will be equally slim.
The final and most important factor when considering use of manned versus unmanned platforms, is the intangible "self-deterrent" role that manned aircraft contribute to the decision-making process of leaders and commanders. celebrate the ability of unmanned vehicles to operate in high-risk environments without regard for a pilot"s safety. 66 Absent the need to worry about downed or captured airmen, planners and leaders may be tempted to send UCAVs into environments where they would never send manned platforms. 67 This is one of the greatest arguments against the use of unmanned platforms across the full spectrum of warfare. While an unmanned strike, air-toair engagement or reconnaissance mission could occur across enemy borders without immediately risking the lives of servicemen and women, the resulting initiation of hostilities could easily dwarf the benefits enjoyed by the "low risk" unmanned combat vehicles. As leaders and operational commanders ponder actions against adversaries, it remains imperative that they respect the consequences of armed conflict and all of its possibilities.
The United States could find itself antagonizing adversaries in multiple theaters, without realizing that many of these transgressions are about to reach a "boiling point." Thus, the self-deterrence inherent in manned flight is one of the most compelling arguments against wholesale introduction of unmanned vehicles into the nation"s military.
NAVAL APPLICATIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE JFMCC
The United States Navy currently seeks integration of unmanned platforms into its Hornet and Super Hornet platforms, it is imperative that the Joint UCAV, effectively utilizing fuel consumption, weight reduction and aerodynamic advantages inherent in unmanned platforms, progresses in order to grant the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) the option of deep strikes in enemy territory in the absence of land-based options.
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CONCLUSIONS
From analysis, two specific conclusions regarding the application of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technology are presented. First and foremost, UAVs are not a panacea, nor are they "one-for-one" replacements for manned platforms. History proves that overreliance on unproven technology leads to catastrophic results. Development of an entirely unmanned force, incapable of operating in adverse weather, unable to survive in a dynamic EW environment, and inflexible within a dynamic scenario that demands multi-role options, would handcuff the operational commander. Many significant challenges must be met before UAV technology can be fully integrated into the future spectrum of warfighting.
The counter argument, and the second conclusion of analysis, is that one cannot possibly deny that unmanned technology presents many new opportunities and options to the operational commander, many unattainable with a fleet of manned platforms. These advantages cannot and should not be denied. UAV technology presents the opportunity for vastly increased ISR coverage, improved tactical Close Air Support (CAS), strikes of targets in high-risk areas, and the potential for cheaper and more effective manned and unmanned platforms. However, these innovations should be introduced to the operational environment only as proven technology allows, and should not be haphazardly forced upon commanders or carelessly integrated into the joint airspace as a result of pressures from Congress, defense 83 Ibid.
analysts or other entities. UAV capabilities will improve with technology, and should be methodically and smartly integrated into the operational environment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Robert Gates, recently summarized the role of unmanned technology in the theater of operations. The most important aspect of any new technology is supplementing the commander in order to provide a "portfolio of options" from which he can choose. 84 By developing manned and unmanned technologies, the commander with be able to select the platform that is most qualified for the mission, whether piloted by an aviator or "flown" by a ground controller. Ultimately, this "portfolio of options" will risk fewer lives, cost less money and be more flexible than either option alone could provide.
Most importantly, expanded capabilities will result in mission accomplishment, allowing achievement of an end state that is most favorable for commanders, the military and the United States of America. 84 Gates, Secretary Robert M., speech to U.S. Naval War College, 19 April 2009.
